Capturing Security Requirements Using Essential Use

Cases (EUCs) by unknown
 D. Zowghi and Z. Jin (Eds.): APRES 2014, CCIS 432, pp. 16–30, 2014. 
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 
Capturing Security Requirements Using Essential Use 
Cases (EUCs) 
Syazwani Yahya 1, Massila Kamalrudin1,**, Safiah Sidek1, and John Grundy2 
1
 Innovative Software System and Services Group,  
Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia  
2
 Faculty of Science, Engineering and Technology 
Swinburne University of Technology 
Melbourne, Australia 
{massila,safiahsidek}@utem.edu.my, syazwaniyahya13@gmail.com, 
jgrundy@swin.edu.au 
Abstract. Capturing security requirements is a complex process, but it is crucial 
to the success of a secure software product. Hence, requirements engineers need 
to have security knowledge when eliciting and analyzing the security require-
ments from business requirements. However, the majority of requirements en-
gineers lack such knowledge and skills, and they face difficulties to capture and 
understand many security terms and issues. This results in capturing inaccurate, 
inconsistent and incomplete security requirements that in turn may lead to inse-
cure software systems. In this paper, we describe a new approach of capturing 
security requirements using an extended Essential Use Cases (EUCs) model. 
This approach enhances the process of capturing and analyzing security re-
quirements to produce accurate and complete requirements. We have evaluated 
our prototype tool using usability testing and assessment of the quality of our 
generated EUC security patterns by security engineering experts.  
Keywords: Software Engineering, Requirements Capturing, Security Require-
ments, Secure Software Development, Essential Use Case (EUC). 
1 Introduction 
There is an increasing need to look at the cost, reliability and safety of software sys-
tems. With the increase of threats and vulnerabilities in many software systems, secu-
rity issues involving software have become widespread, frequent and serious. We 
believe that enumerating accurate security requirements can help system architects 
and security engineers to develop realistic and meaningful secure software [1]. Secu-
rity requirements elicitation is usually conducted during the early phase of the system 
life cycle. Often these are only generic lists of security mechanisms, such as password 
protection, firewalls, virus detection tools and SSL layer (for cryptographically pro-
tecting communications) [1, 2] [12]. However, these security requirements often do 
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not present a complete solution to the security problems of the target application un-
der development. It is crucial for software engineers to accurately capture the essen-
tial security mechanisms (such as access control) and implement the correct design 
solutions for security (such as robust design and good technology choices) that makes 
software attacks much more difficult. In our experience, we have found that security 
requirements elicitation and analysis necessary for a better set of security require-
ments seldom happens. According to Salini [12], even if it is done, the security re-
quirements are often developed independently from the rest of the requirements engi-
neering activities: They are not integrated into the mainstream of the requirements 
engineering activities. As a consequence, security requirements that are specific to the 
application of software or system and the protection of essential services and assets 
are often neglected. A lot of requirements engineering research and practice have tried 
to address the security capabilities that a software or system should provide. Howev-
er, they have limited focus since they tend to describe design solution in terms of 
protection mechanisms only. They lack of making declarative propositions [12] with 
regards to the required level of protection that can be accurately established by captur-
ing the correct security requirements in the first place.  
A lot of attention has been given to the functional requirements of the system from 
the user’s view, whilst less attention is given to security requirements. [6][12]. Many 
practices do not tackle security requirements at all, but rather focus on the implemen-
tation mechanisms intended to satisfy unstated requirements and assumptions. As a 
result, security requirements that are specific to the system and that provide protection 
of essential services and assets are often neglected. This can cause substantial security 
problems at a later stage [2, 3]. In practice, when capturing security requirements 
from clients, requirements engineers frequently use some forms of natural language, 
written either by clients or themselves. This forms a human-centric representation of 
the requirements accessible to both the engineers and clients. However, due to the 
ambiguities and complexities of the natural language and the process of capture, these 
requirements often have inconsistencies, redundancies, incompleteness and omissions 
which can lead to the development of inaccurate secure software. Our research de-
scribed in this paper introduces a new, more effective approach using semi-formal 
models called Essential Use Cases (EUCs) that support requirements engineers in 
capturing security requirements. This study is an extension of our earlier work [34] 
[36] to provide better supports for the capturing of security requirements that can 
enhance the correctness and completeness of the captured security requirements.  
This study contributes to the enhancement of the quality of software intended to be 
developed. The essence of the approach is to support capturing security elements from 
the normal business requirements expressed in natural language. To allow require-
ments engineers and stakeholders to detect security requirements, we adopted the 
concept of essential interactions patterns and essential use case patterns. We hig-
hlighted the potential of this tool for quality security requirements by annotating a 
visual, semiformal model of the security requirements and normal business require-
ments depicted in our support tool. We evaluated the usability of our prototype tool 
using a survey conducted with a sample of selected end-users. An evaluation of our 
security requirements patterns by experts was also conducted. 
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2 Background 
The Essential Use Case (EUC) approach was developed by Constantine and Lock-
wood [37]. EUCs are designed to resolve problems which occur in conventional Use 
Case modeling and they have important benefits over that approach [41]. An EUC is 
defined as a “structured narrative, expressed in a language of the application domain 
and of users, comprising a simplified, generalized, abstract, technology free and inde-
pendent description of one task or interaction that is complete, meaningful, and well-
defined from the point of view of users in some role or roles in relation to a system 
and that embodies the purpose or intentions underlying the interaction” [37]. An EUC 
is thus a form of dialogue between a user and a system which supports better commu-
nication between the developers and the stakeholders. An EUC is shorter and simpler 
as compared to a conventional use case since it comprises an abstraction of only es-
sential steps and the user’s intrinsic interest. An EUC aims to identify “what the sys-
tem must do” without being concerned on “how it should be done”.  
EUCs are made up of a set of organized “abstract interactions” and EUCs extracted 
from natural language specifications can be compared against templates of “interac-
tion patterns” to detect requirements quality problems. Requirements engineers need 
to derive appropriate essential interactions from the requirements at a correct level of 
abstraction. Biddle et al. [42] and Kamalrudin et al. [5] found that almost all users 
have problems defining the right level of abstraction and exerted that the abstraction 
process to be time consuming. These problems are some of the reasons why it is diffi-
cult to check security requirements for consistency and completeness. In this case,  
we anticipate that a Security Essential Interaction Library can mitigate these prob-
lems. This library consists of important key phrases (security essential interactions) 
and mappings to appropriate essential security requirements (security abstract  
interactions).  
A key reason for choosing the EUC model is that it lends itself to a deeper analysis 
that enables the identification of security requirements by extracting from the normal 
business requirements. Once a EUC model has been extracted, it can be compared 
against a pattern in our SecEUC Interaction Pattern Library. 
3 Motivation 
Many studies have found that most software engineers have poor training in eliciting, 
analyzing, and specifying the security requirements. This is due to a considerable lack 
of security knowledge [1] [15] [16] [17] [18]. New security challenges are growing 
along with today’s complexity and interoperability software systems development. 
Requirements are provided by a variety of project partners; thus, the specifications are 
voluminous and contain many requirements. Further, the process of manually eliciting 
requirements is tedious [3]. To correctly capture security requirements, good skills 
and knowledge in both the requirements and security areas are required. Shielding 
security loopholes and establishing correct and accurate security requirements are 
considered to be a difficult task. Yet, this essential element is taken for granted by 
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many. It is important for requirements engineers to understand that security require-
ments are more than just dealing with security solutions that provide strong pass-
words, configure SSL, or validate user input. It involves a process of accurately cap-
turing the right security controls for what the applications and business really needs. 
However, requirements engineers often fail to pay sufficient attention to security con-
cerns, treating them as non-functional requirements [4]. The majority of software 
projects deal with the security when the system has already been designed and some-
times even when it has been put into operation. In extreme cases, the actual security 
requirements themselves are never well understood [4].  Requirements engineers 
without sufficient experience in security face the risk of over-looking security re-
quirements leading to security vulnerabilities that are easily exploited [3]. It is widely 
known that security requirements need to be considered at the early stage of software 
development.  
Recognizing the importance of security requirements in achieving a secure soft-
ware development, Microsoft has adopted a systematic security assurance process, the 
Security Development Lifecycle (SDL). As a company-wide initiative and a mandato-
ry policy since 2004, the SDL has a significant role in embedding security and priva-
cy in the software and culture at Microsoft. During the software development life 
cycle (SDLC), security requirements are elicited at the most early phase, which is at 
the requirement phase, as shown in Figure 1 [13]: 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle – Simplified [13] 
In a software organization, it is common to have a project team that consists of re-
quirements engineers and security engineers. The primary responsibilities of require-
ments engineers or system analysts are to gather, analyze, document and validate the 
needs of the project stakeholders [14]. They are responsible at the requirement phase 
which is to capture security requirements from clients. Security engineers, on the 
other hand are responsible for designing, developing and deploying security related 
systems and security in systems. Their responsibilities and skills can be very specific 
such as designing a hardware security appliance [19]. The task of a security engineer 
is usually centered at the implementation or design phase.  
Although both engineers have complementary responsibilities in capturing re-
quirements, they do not communicate effectively with each other; hence, there is a 
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lack of integration on the work done between them. This condition can lead to incon-
sistency and incorrectness of the developed software and it fails to fulfill the needs of 
the stakeholders. Additionally, the existing standard, such as the Common Criteria 
(ISO) has been identified as extensive, complex and difficult to comprehend by re-
quirements engineers [27]. The existing techniques, such as interviews and brains-
torming are found to be time consuming and fail to accurately identify security  
requirements. In this case, captured security requirements using the existing standards 
and techniques are prone to be inaccurate, inconsistent and incomplete, and this can 
lead to insecure software systems.  
4 Our Approach 
We explored the use of semi-formal model Essential Use Cases (EUCs) to develop a 
new approach for capturing security requirements. We automate the capturing process 
of security requirements from the business requirements using (EUCs) model. Fur-
ther, a rapid prototyping approach was adopted to ensure the production of accurate 
and secure software. Next, pattern libraries called Security Essential Use Cases (Se-
cEUC), Security Essential Interactions (SecEI) and Security Controls Patterns 
(SecCtrl) library were developed to assist the capturing process for security require-
ments. This is a lightweight approach that allows requirements engineers to identify 
and capture the security requirements and keep them consistent within the business 
requirements. The following section describes the pattern library for capturing securi-
ty requirements. 
4.1 SecEUC Pattern Libraries 
Our security pattern library consists of three library patterns, which are the Security 
Essential Use Cases (SecEUC), Security Essential Interaction (SecEI), and Security 
Controls (SecCtrl) patterns. The SecEUC library patterns which is based on EUCs 
was generated from the normal business requirements, while the SecEI library pat-
terns is based on the essential interactions found in the textual requirements related to 
security elements. The development of the SecEUC patterns was adapted from the 
works of Kamalrudin et al. 2011 [34] [36]. Through the extraction process, phrases 
from the textual natural language requirements were analyzed and matched to the 
essential interaction pattern library to find an appropriate abstract interaction. The 
abstract interactions associated with security are called SecEUC. Essential Interac-
tions that contain the security elements are called SecEI.  
The identification of associated security elements are based on the definitions from 
the basic security services [38]. It was found that multiple SecEI are associated with 
one SecEUC. For example, the essential interaction “key in username and password” 
and “log in” were identified as security related and they were mapped to a SecEUC 
“identify self”. This is because all of them have the attributes of security. Other ex-
amples of the pattern library are shown in Table 1.We then designed our SecCtrl  
library patterns based on basic security services [38], such as the access control  
(authorization), authentication (integrity), confidentiality (privacy), availability and 
accountability (non-repudiation). The SecCtrl was developed for the purpose of  
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mapping it to the prototype generation and providing the mandatory security controls. 
This pattern library helped us to identify the security controls that are relevant to a 
particular SecEUC. The association between the SecEUC and SecCtrl is that one Se-
cEUC can have one or more than one SecCtrl. For example, “Identify Self” of SecEuc 
was mapped to “Authentication” and “Authorization” SecCtrl. Other examples of the 
pattern library are shown in Table 1.    
Table 1. Examples of our security-oriented EUC pattern libraries 
 SecEI SecEUC SecCtrl 
Check password  Identify Self Authentication  
Authorization  Check  username  
Verify username  
Make payment  Make payment  Authentication  
Transaction  Complete payment form  
4.2 Using Our Approach 
Figure 2 shows the overview of our approach that enhances the process of capturing 
security requirements. The process of our approach begins after the requirement engi-
neer gathered the requirements from the stakeholders. The collected requirements are 
in the forms of textual natural language requirements. The followings are the se-
quence of the process.  
 
Fig. 2. Overview of our approach 
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The process starts when the textual requirements are analyzed and traced to the 
EUCs patterns library for appropriate abstract interaction in a form of EUC model (1). 
Then, SecEUC are derived from the generated EUC Models based on the categoriza-
tion of their attribute related to the security element as defined in the SecEUC pattern 
library (2).  Each SecEUC is mapped to EUI pattern library (3) for the generation of 
abstract prototype in a form of EUI model. Then, each EUI model is verified with a 
defined mandatory security control in the SecCtrl library patterns (4). Next, a recom-
mendation of graphical user interfaces (GUI) is provided to visualize the security 
requirements based on the generated SecEUC (5). This helps to ensure the consisten-
cy and correctness of the captured security requirements with the original business 
requirements provided by the end-user.  
5 Tool Support and Usage Example  
5.1 SecMEReq : Prototype Tool 
We have developed a prototype tool to support our EUC-based requirements capture 
and analysis process, an extension of our earlier MEReq [7] tool. Figure 3 shows our 
extended version of MEReq, called SecMEReq. The tool allows requirements engi-
neers to automate the elicitation process for capturing security requirements. The 
selected phrases in the textual requirements show the resulting extracted security es-
sential interactions. Meanwhile, the selected essential interactions show the sources 
from which the textual natural language phrases were derived. This provides a tracea-
bility support mechanism between the textual natural language requirements and the 
derived security EUC models. Engineers can then modify the generated security EUC 
model and/or the original textual natural language requirements. This includes adding 
phrases and interactions, re-ordering phrases and interactions, uploading and re-
uploading requirements, deleting phrases and interactions and modifying phrases and 
interactions descriptive texts. Users (engineers) are also allowed to re-extract the es-
sential interactions and associated traceability links. In this case, engineers need to 
have a basic understanding of the Essential Use Case concept and methodology only. 
To demonstrate, our tool key features, user scenario and figure of the tool support are 
provided as below:  
Nancy, a requirements engineer, would like to validate the security requirements 
which has a mixture of the business and security requirements, which she has col-
lected from a client, Nick, who is a car rental information manager. To do this, as 
shown in Figure 3, she types the requirements in a form of user scenario or copies 
them from an existing file on the textual editor (1). Once she has finished typing or 
copying the requirements, the tool generates the model of the essential requirements 
(abstract interactions) and the screen will show the EUC models containing the user 
interaction and system responsibility side by side to the chosen requirements (2). On 
the same display screen, she verifies the list of abstract interactions provided by the 
tool as shown in figure 4. From the generated EUC, she then captures the security 
requirements from the business requirements in a form of SecEUC which is presented 
in the green color boxes.  Further, she checks the consistency and dependencies  
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5.2 Tool Architecture 
Fig. 5
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females. The average age of the students was 22 years old. They were final year stu-
dents from the Bachelor of Computer Science majoring in Software Engineering. 
They have sufficient understanding of requirements engineering and were familiar 
with the concept and methodology of essential use cases and security .To explore the 
functionality of the tool, the students were provided with a set of requirements on 
“online car rental registration”. They were informed that they will be observed and 
they are free to say aloud their responses of the tool while completing the task.  The 
purpose of the observation was to identify the problems and misconceptions faced by 
the participants when using the tool. Further, the say aloud evaluation of the tool pro-
vided us with the users’ spontaneous responses and suggestions for improvement. 
After the completion of the task, students were requested to answer four questions 
related to the usability [5] which consists of the  usefulness, ease of use, ease of 
learning and satisfaction of the tool based on a five-level Likert scale. Students’ res-
ponses for these questions were analysed and the results of the survey are shown in 
Figure 6.  
 
Fig. 6. Preliminary Usability Test Results 
More than 90% of the participants agreed that the tool is useful, 70% agreed that 
the tool is easy to use, 80% agreed that the tool is easy to learn, and 70% were satis-
fied with the tool. None of the participants expressed disagreement to the four aspects 
evaluated in this survey. It can be concluded that our prototype tool is useful, easy to 
use, easy to understand and able to satisfy users. There are some enhancements that 
we need to consider for the refinement of our tool. Based on the say aloud responses, 
the suggestions given by the participants were mostly related to the improvement of 
the interface design of the tool and the provision of a user manual or a tutorial for 
users. Therefore, we plan to integrate the tool with existing security tools with the 
security features to ease the design and development phase. This stage is closely re-
lated to the work of the security engineers. Key threats to the validity of this findings 
are the selection bias due to our method of selecting the sample. The selection of par-
ticipants for the preliminary study was based on one group of students. Hence, the 
subjects in the group were not homogenous with regards to the preference of the  
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interface design. However, they were similar in one or more of the subject-related 
variables, such as the agreement towards the easiness of using the tool.  
6.2 Preliminary SecEUC Patterns Evaluation  
We also conducted an evaluation of our SecEUC patterns using five experts in securi-
ty requirements from IBM Corporation from India, Austria, France and Malaysia. 
They were invited to evaluate the correctness of our new SecEUC patterns library by 
evaluating the classification of security controls with the associated SecEUC and 
SecEI. They were given five sets of requirements from a small size security applica-
tion requirements document. This consisted of 10 SecEUC, 50 SecEI and five basic 
security controls: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and authoriza-
tion. They were asked to answer a few questions using likert-scale and some open 
ended questions. The results of this expert evaluation are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Preliminary Patterns Evaluation Results 
As shown in Figure 7, all of the general security controls rating have some disa-
greement. Based on this feedback, the disagreement does not mean that we have  
provided incorrect selection, but they would prefer some other security control classi-
fications for each of the SecEUC. They requested more options for security controls 
for more complex requirements. For example, the security requirements “login” are 
currently mapped to the security controls “Authorization”. Some experts think it 
should be mapped to another security control such as Authentication. They also of-
fered some recommendations for correct and relevant security controls associated to a 
particular SecEUC. Here, we will update the security patterns from time to time in 
accordance with this feedback. Based on this study, the dependency on basic security 
services is not purely relevant for capturing more complex security requirements. 
Therefore, a further study on the patterns relates to more establish security standards 
is required. 
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7 Related Work 
Many methods, approaches, techniques and tools have been used to capture security 
requirements. Viega [22], showed how to build security requirements in a structured 
manner that is conducive to iterative refinement. If this structured procedure is fol-
lowed correctly according to the metrics for evaluation, it would serve as a framework 
that provides a significant improvement for the traditional methods that do not con-
sider security at all. They also provided an example using a simple three-tiered archi-
tecture. The basic idea behind the way that CLASP handles security requirements is 
the performance of a structured walkthrough of resources, determining how they ad-
dress each core security service throughout the lifetime of that resource. While it is 
obviously far more effective than any ad-hoc treatment of security requirements, this 
methodology is still new and immature.  
Hussein and Zulkernine [23], proposed a framework for developing components 
with intrusion detection capabilities. The first stage of this framework is requirements 
elicitation, in which developers identify services and intrusions. In this framework, 
they capture users requirements regarding the services and functionalities provided by 
the components, and identify the unwanted or illegal usage of components by intrud-
ers. Intrusion scenarios are elicited through the use of misuse-cases of a UML profile 
called UMLintr. Yet, their proposed framework still needs an extension scope on 
UMLintr to other security requirements. UMLintr can be extended by exploring how 
to specify and handle other security requirements like authentication, authorization, 
integrity, etc. Their framework is also considered as complex intrusion scenarios. 
While Agile Security Requirements Engineering proposes the extension of agile prac-
tices to deal with security in an informal, communicative and assurance-driven spirit, 
it has its own limitation. It is only partially support consistency and does not support 
correctness and validation checking between security and business requirements.  
i* frame is a modeling and analysis framework for organizational environments 
and their software systems, and is based on the intentionality relations between 
agents. Tropos [26] adopts the i* modeling framework and is an agent- oriented soft-
ware system development methodology. However, it focuses on describing both or-
ganizational environment of a system and a system itself. A secure Tropos framework 
to model and analyze the security requirements is then built using the Secure Tropos 
methodology [27]. It especially addresses the problem of modeling security require-
ments through ownership, permission and delegation among the actors or agents  
involved in the software system. In our previous research [26] we reviewed a few 
related tools, such as STS-Tool [27], SecTro [28], SecReq [31], SREPPLine [30] and 
ST-Tool [31]. Many researchers have done great works on their research of security 
requirements engineering, particularly involving a tool that supports the security re-
quirement engineering. We found that most work used a modeling approach, such as 
use cases, misuse cases, and UMLsec, to handle security requirements. UML models 
are the most commonly used [34],  especially use case diagrams that are widely used 
by developers and requirements engineers to elicit and capture requirements. Kama-
lrudin et al. [7], [34] have shown that EUCs are useful to capture and validate  
the quality of requirements. EUCs also benefit the development process as they fit a 
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problem-oriented rather than solution–oriented approach, thus they have the potential 
to allow designers and implementers of the user interface to explore more possibili-
ties. This approach allows for a more rapid development, whereby when using EUCs, 
it is no longer necessary to design an actual user interface. Although EUCs simplify 
captured requirements as compared to the conventional UML use cases, and it is 
beneficial to integrate the requirements and design [35][39], they have not explored 
the process of capturing security requirements.  
8 Conclusion and Future Work 
We have described a new approach to supporting security requirements capture and 
analysis using Essential Use Case models. Our prototype tool, SecMereq, provides 
support for extracting EUCs and security requirements from natural language text, 
prototype generation including security interfaces, and validation of extracted security 
requirements using a library of security related patterns. We have evaluated our tool 
in terms of both its usability for target end users, and for quality of the encoded EUC-
based security patterns. 
In future, we plan to enhance our security pattern library using a-well-established 
standard: Common Criteria. Then we intend to compare the efficacy of our tool with 
manual approaches of extracting security requirements. Additionally, we will work on 
the possibility of automating currently complicated usage of the standard to produce a 
simpler practice by using our tool support. This would then create the possibility of 
allowing a complete and consistent capture of security requirements from normal 
business requirements. 
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